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• Failure of Space Shuttle Orbiter 
RINGFlow Control Valve FCV Po et 
• During the ascent of Endeavour (OV-1 05) on Space Shuttle mission 
STS-126, the main propulsion system (MPS) engine #2 GH2 flow 
control valve (FCV) appeared to make an un-commanded transition 
from the low-flow to high-flow position 
- This anomaly did not impact mission success 
- Post-mission disassembly of the FCV revealed that the poppet 
was fractured and a crescent-sha ed iece was missing 
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• GH2 Flow Control Valve (FCV) 
• One FCV per main engine ' 
- Controls the flow of GH2 pressurant to the external tank (ET) 
- Two positions: low and high flow 
- Operating_ pressure is approximately 3400 psig 
• Poppet is made from CRES 440A 
Orbiter MPS GH2 FeV 
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• FCV Poppet 
"Barrel" or "spool" 
"Upstream flange", or "shim flange" 
"Flow flange", a.k.a, "downstream flange", or simply "the flange" 
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• Optical Fractography 
• oppet fracture surface exhibited five (5) distinct zones: 
- Zones 1 & 2: Initial "thumbnails" 
- Zone 3's (2): Circumferential propagation 
- Zone 4 & 5: Propagation through the flange and final fracture 
• Fracture initiation occurred at middle of the body-to-flange radius and 
primarily propagated circumferentially along the radius, then through the 
flange thickness 
- The general plane of the fracture was -450 from the flange face 
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• Zones 1 & 2: Initial thumbnails 
• Fracture initiated 
on two planes 
along the radius 
surface, then 
merged together 
into one plane 
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• Zone 1: Initial thumbnail 
• Scanning electron 
fractography revealed: 
• small, semi-planar areas 
• rounded ridges 
• exposed carbide particles, 
• "divots", which presumably 
resulted from spherical 
carbides being pulled out 
(i.e., carbide decohesion). 
• No substantial secondary 
or intergranular cracking 
• No striations 
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• Zone 2: Outer thumbnail 
• In Zone 2, the fracture propagated on a less torturous path, exhibiting larger 
"semi-planar" regions, consisted with the smooth, shiny optical appearance. 
Otherwise, the features were fairly consistent with that of Zone 1. 
A. Large 
blocky carbide 
typical of 
CRES 440 
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Zones 1 & 2 
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• Zone 3 "Wings" 
• From the thumbnails, the fracture propagated circumferentially along the 
radius, not penetrating further into the flange thickness 
• The topography of the fracture surface in the Zone 3 wings was similar to 
that of Zone 1 
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• 
Zone 4: Propagation through th 
flange 
• he fracture surface increased in general roughness in Zone 4 
- Exhibited some secondary cracking 
- Sharper, more angular features 
• Fracture toughness testing of 440A at NASA-MSFC in a 3400 psig GH2 environment 
clearly demonstrated that the features of Zone 4 were consistent with a sustained 
load cracking mechanism 
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• Zone 5: Final fracture 
• The Zone 5 "corners" 
exhibited a fracture 
surface typical of final, 
rapid overload 
- Primarily dimpled 
rupture 
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• Summary of Poppet Analysis 
• Investigation concluded that the poppet failed due to fatigue 
cracking that, most likely, occurred under changing loading 
conditions, explaining the multiple zones observed 
- Comparison of the various zones with fracture surfaces . 
generated by testing specimens in GH2 at MSFC indicated that 
the cracks most likely initiated in a hydrogen environment 
- These comparisons also revealed that the crack propagation 
through the flange wall (Zone 4) was primarily driven by a 
sustained load (mean stress) cracking mechanism in GH2 
• No evidence of a defect was found that would explain the failure, 
such as corrosion, a raw material flaw, or other anomaly 
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• 
. Fatigue Testing of Old Poppet 
• At the time the failure occurred, there was no known cyclic I-oading 
of the poppet to explain the fatigue failure 
- Also unknown was whether the fracture surfaces indicated a 
high cycle fatigue mechanism consistent with flow-induced 
vibration or a low cycle mechanism consistent with poppet 
actuation (translation from low to high flow) 
• A test program was conducted using obsolete poppets that were no 
longer in service 
- To acquire results quickly, the testing was performed with 
mechanical loading of the flange, as opposed to performing a 
series of flow tests 
- A hook mechanism was used to pull on the poppet flange, 
loading the radius in tension 
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• Test Setup 
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• Test Results 
• he test results were very inconsistent, with lighter test 
loads resulting in relatively fast failures 
• Morr9 importantly, the "quick failures" exhibited the 
thumbnail zones characteristic of the original failure 
• Conclusion: The thumbnail cracks were pre-existing 
SIN I Test Load (Ibs.) Cycles to Thumbnail 
@ R = 0.1 Failure 
530-01 First 150lbs 1M cycles No 
250lbs 12K cycles 
530-06 1751bs 3600 cycles Yes (2) 
530-01 Second 1751bs 1684 cycles Yes (2) 
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• Test Article Fractography 
The thumbnail zones of 
the test articles exhibited 
fracture features that 
were very similar to that 
of the original failure 
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A Fleet-Wide Issue 
• The discovery of pre-existing thumbnail cracks in the previous, now 
"retired" flight hardware used for the fatigue testing indicated that 
poppet cracking was a generic problem that had existed for the life 
of the Shuttle program 
• Subsequently, the program developed an eddy current (EC) 
technique that was capable of reliably detecting these small, very 
tight cracks 
- EC detected cracks in 10 of 15 retired flight poppets 
• Before the next mission after STS-126 could be flown, the integrity 
of the current flight hardware required verification 
- EC inspections found 4 of 13 cracked 
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• Ongoing Risk Mitigation 
• With so few missions remaining for the Shuttle program, there is 
insufficient time to implement a peFmanent corrective action, so the 
program is mitigating the risk of using the current flight poppets by 
monitoring their "health" with EC inspections 
- Each poppet is inspected after every mission 
- After GN2 flow balance testing at the valve vendor 
- After GH2 flow calibration and mission duty cycle (MDC) testing 
atWSTF 
• To date, a total of 12 current flight ~nits, including the original failure, 
have been found cracked by EC inspections 
- All cracks subsequently verified by SEM examination 
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Cracked Zero-Flight Poppets 
• Of the current flight hardware poppets found cracked, five of them 
were actually new poppets, pulled from spares, that were to replace 
poppets that had been found to be cracked 
- In each case, the EC inspections after MDC testing at WSTF 
detected the cracks 
• EC inspections prior to MDC did not detect the cracks 
• Fractography of two zero-flight poppets found that the fractures were 
. quite similar to the original failure and the cracked obsolete (fatigue 
test) poppets 
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• Conclusions 
• The poppet failed during STS-126 due to fatigue cracking that most 
likely was initiated during MDe ground- testing 
• This failure ultimately led to the discovery that the cracking problem 
was a generic issue effecting numerous poppets throughout the 
Shuttle program's history 
• This presentation has focused on the laboratory analysis of the 
failed hardware, but this analysis was only one aspect of a 
comprehensive failure investigation. One critical aspect of the 
overall investigation was modeling of the fluid flow through this valve 
to determine the possible sources of cyclic loading 
- This work has led to the conclusion that the poppets are failing 
due to flow-induced vibration 
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